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In recent years, Europe has experienced a rise in politics based on 
antagonism, often discussed from the perspectives of populism and the 
mainstreaming of the ideologies of the radical right. In this study, we argue 
that there is a need for an interdisciplinary, theoretically broader and more 
empirically focused approach that fosters understanding of these 
developments. To explore the causal factors, we focus on the enemy images 
that are constructed and diffused by politicians, and their specific historical 
and structural contexts. The paper thus has two main components: First, we 
review what political theory, research on populism and on the extreme right 
and social psychology say about the functions of the use and development of 
enemy images. Second, we highlight the contextual factors that we consider 
make the success of a politics based on enemy images more likely in Central 
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I. Introduction 
 
In recent years, Europe has experienced the rise of a politics based on 
antagonism. Right-wing populist parties have won national elections in Hungary and 
Poland, there has been an intense ‘blame game’ between Germany and Greece in 
relation to the debt crisis (Mylonas, 2012; Wodak and Angouri, 2014), anti-
immigration discourse has been on the rise since mid-2015, Central and Eastern 
European immigrants have been blamed for taking British jobs (Fitzgerald and 
Smoczynski, 2015), and Central and Eastern Europeans tend to blame Middle 
Eastern refugees who are fleeing war for spreading terror (Tremlett and Messing, 
2015; Győri, 2016; Klaus, 2017). Those phenomena have usually been discussed 
from the perspectives of populism and the mainstreaming of radical right-wing 
ideologies. Here we argue that there is a dire need for an interdisciplinary, 
theoretically broader and empirically more focused approach to understanding the 
recent developments, in which the key is a focus on the ‘images of the enemy’ 
constructed by political actors, and their historical and structural context. 
Enemy-making has essentially always been a part of politics. For Carl Schmitt, 
the friend-enemy distinction is the ultimate, defining distinction of politics to which 
every political action and motive can be reduced’ (Schmitt, 2008: 26). Through this 
distinction, politics defines ing- and aoutgroups, political communities and Others, be 
they a state, organization or an abstract power. Although in contemporary European 
politics threats of violence and their actual use are relatively rare, the enemy is 
invariably pictured as someone who poses an existential threat to the community. In 
consequence, enmification and the possibility of the actual annihilation of ‘the enemy’ 
is still an important part of politics, even when hidden or left unmentioned. 
Although enemy-making is a substantial part of politics, its intensity and forms 
are always changing. Open antagonism has recently overtaken the political mainstream 
in Europe. The use of the ‘enemy’ narrative is now intense, regardless of electoral 
campaign cycles that have regulated it before. Enemies are invoked to fuel various 
mobilization efforts outside of elections: popular votes, pro- and anti-government 
protests, mobilizations pro- and against refugees, consultations, petitions, contentious 
activities of the left and right wing, and so on.  
The discourse on enemies has become more aggressive, and the identification 
of enemies increasingly more explicit and open: on the one hand, hostile labelling of 
vulnerable social groups (the poor, immigrants, Muslims, the Roma, LGBT people) is 
probably more prevalent now than it has been since WWII. On the other hand, 
political adversaries (opposition parties, civil society organizations and movements, 
trade unions) are explicitly referred to as those who need to be disciplined and 
restricted in their activity.
1
 
Why has the use of the concept of the enemy intensified lately? Why do 
politicians in Central and Eastern Europe target vulnerable groups as enemies, and 
link them to their political adversaries? We argue that answering these questions 
                                                        
1
 For example, measures against NGOs that criticize the government have been taken to a new level by 
the Russian and Hungarian governments. NGOs that receive funding from abroad now have to register 
themselves as foreign agents in Russia, and label themselves as being ‘supported from foreign resources’ 
in Hungary. See: Yasmeen Serhan: Hungary’s Anti-foreign NGO law. The Atlantic, 13/06/2017 . 
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requires an interdisciplinary approach. Such an approach should combine 
considerations of political theory about the functions of the concept of enemy in 
politics, pre-existing empirical research about the use of enemy images by political 
actors, and the contextual factors that provide favorable conditions for such a politics. 
Naturally, one such study cannot cover all this ground; therefore, we now focus 
on two tasks. First, we review what political theory, research on populism and on the 
extreme right and social psychology say about the use and development of enemy 
images. Second, we highlight the contextual factors that make the success of politics 
based on enemy images more likely in Central and Eastern Europe.  
By doing this, we intend to support our claim not only that ‘the enemy’ still has 
an important role in political theory, but that 1) this issue should be empirically 
examined more broadly than just in relation to populism and the extreme right, and 2) 
this examination should go beyond the political process approach by including more 
sociological, and even social psychological, aspects. This approach would clarify how 
structural conditions lead to group processes and to a social psychological state in 
which politics based on enemy-making seems more likely. Furthermore, this type of 
politics triggers the creation of structural conditions that encourage further 
radicalization.  
After venturing into the problems involved with defining the enemy, we turn to 
political theory – namely, to Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe, whose works focus on 
the fundamental role of enemies in politics. Political sociology is more empirically 
focused. The extreme right and modern populism are considered to use enemy 
images extensively; thus, through a short review we summarize the use of enemy 
images by these actors. We complete the first task with an explanation based on 
studies from social psychology of why the intensity of the development of enemy 
images might be different in various contexts.
2
 
After reviewing the literature, we examine the factors that condition the political 
actors of Central and Eastern Europe to use enmification in their politics. 
Enmification is more likely when the social structure is more hierarchical, and 
members of society are constantly exposed to uncertainty and to relative deprivation. 
These historically embedded factors are strengthened by more recent developments 
such as a transnational, Europeanized political context, and the results of the 
economic crisis of 2008. Finally, we suggest that the changes in the media and the 
mediated public sphere play a decisive role in intensifying the use of enemies as a 
main platform for public discourse.  
 
II. The ‘enemy’ in politics 
 
One would expect the term ‘enemy’ to have a simple and consensual definition. 
However, what we have found is that proper definition of this term in studies that deal 
with enemies in politics is lacking. Despite the ambiguities, there are three domains – 
                                                        
2
 The use and development of enemy images could involve more disciplines and research areas. We are 
well aware that the issue of the perception of the Other has been well addressed by research on identity, 
on constructing the in-group and Otherness, on prejudices, anti-Semitism, and racism or securitization. 
These approaches have much to say about the topic. Here, however, we only build on the disciplines we 
consider address more closely the mechanisms of recent political processes. 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE USE OF ENEMY IMAGES 17 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 14-40. 
political theory, political sociology and social psychology – where the concept of the 
enemy has received more attention. Thus, after elaborating the concept itself, we 
summarize what political theory (namely that of Schmitt and Mouffe) and students of 
populism and the extreme right tell us about the use of enemies. We then turn to the 
mechanisms of the development of enemy images, as examined by social psychology. 
 
II.1. Concepts and definition 
 
At first sight, understanding the ‘enemy’ as a concept seems simple: the enemy 
is someone (a group, a nation, a person) who tries to destroy ‘Us.’ Yet, as simple it 
may seem, it is hard to find a clear, well-formulated definition of ‘the enemy’. Some 
studies lack definitions entirely, using the term as if the meaning is evident, or as used 
in public discourse (e.g. Fergusson et al. 2014; Holt and Silverstein, 1989; Silverstein, 
1989). Others who have defined the enemy use various terms and concepts. For 
example, Schmitt (2008) defines an enemy as an actor who poses an existential threat 
to a community considered an in-group, while Oppenheimer defines an enemy only 
as a ‘specific form of a negative stereotype’, (Oppenheimer, 2006: 269). Volkan 
(1985) describes the enemy as the antithesis of an ally. This always involves ‘attributing 
to [the ally] all the qualities the culture considers good: honesty, integrity, cleanliness 
and loyalty’ (Volkan, 1985: 224).
3
 Thus, the enemy must be dishonest, amoral and 
non-loyal. Ramet (1999) applies a similar strategy. He also describes the enemy 
through its attributes, and cites an enumeration of these by James Aho: ‘“Dregs” of 
the society, from its lower part, […] it is sewage from the gutter, “trash” excreted as 
poison from society’s affairs’ (Aho, 1994 cited by Ramet, 1999: 4). 
It seems that scholars generally try to express the notion of enmity, instead of 
defining it by capturing the emotional content of the concept. The important thing is 
that enmification always involves strong feelings: perception of hostility, anger, hatred 
from and towards the enemy, which points towards their dehumanization. 
The role of emotions becomes more important with an increase in the 
vagueness of the description of the enemy. Here, making a distinction between 
traditional images of the enemy and enemy images used in modern politics seems 
crucial. Traditional enemies are associated with warfare; they are external actors that 
pose a physical threat, while modern, political enemies are not necessarily outsiders, 
the threat of physical elimination is relatively uncommon and the image itself is much 
less clear (Holt, 1989; Schmitt, 2008; Schwab, 1987). In the latter case, the enemy 
may be internal, such as ‘the elite’ for populists, ‘the Roma’, ‘Muslims’, ‘immigrants’ 
or ‘Jews’ for the extreme right, but also various hidden, invisible groups or traitors 
(Szabó, 2007) or simply political adversaries, parties and movements (Schmitt, 2008; 
Szabó 2007). While the traditional enemy is an external actor before it becomes an 
enemy, the modern enemy is externalized because it is an enemy. Thus, groups or 
actors labeled enemies are externalized by a discursive act of exclusion. 
Enemies can be personal or collective. Holt (1989) differentiates between 
personal and public (or national) enemies, while Jung et al. (2002) distinguish between 
                                                        
3
 Volkan relies on a definition suggested by Murray Edelman in a presentation at the International Society 
of Political Psychology (Volkan 1985:224).  
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individual and national perceptions in the enmification of countries. In Holt’s study, 
American college students treated both private and public (political) enemies as 
threatening. Perceptions about private enemies, however, were associated with strong 
feelings such as hate, while students were more likely to associate public enemies with 
ideological and axiological differences.  
Although the concept of the enemy is not as clear as one might expect, its use 
affects the political process. Silverstein (1989) points to cognitive studies that assume 
that enemy images distort information processing. Nations considered enemies are 
not only seen as more hostile, but information processing about them is selective. 
People are more likely to notice information about the enemy’s aggressive actions 
than about their peaceful acts. Furthermore, people attribute harmful, aggressive 
actions to their enemies even when other actors carry them out. In line with this 
observation, social mediation studies found that negative articles about the U.S.’s main 
enemy, the Soviet Union, were more prevalent than positive ones in significant 
American newspapers. Fergusson et al. (2014) argue that politicians need an enemy to 
obtain an electoral advantage. Such actors might present the problem of the existence 
of enemies as a task which they are best suited for managing. Accordingly, the authors 
suggest, enmification is an action-legitimizing strategy. Moreover, keeping the image of 
the enemy alive and visible is also an important method of avoiding being perceived as 
superfluous. 
The most important advantage of creating and maintaining enemy images is the 
contribution this makes to the sustainability of the imagined political community.
4
 
This is so because ‘group identity is defined by contrast to other groups and is the 
result of systematic comparisons with and differentiation from other groups’ 
(Oppenheimer, 2006: 271). In cases of international conflicts, the relevant group 
might be a nation, while in internal conflicts it might be true Hungarians, Czech, 
Poles, true democrats, or any other group. Pointing out the enemy may be the main 
method of creating a group, since the enemy should be precisely the opposite of ‘Us’. 
By strengthening loyalty and evoking strong emotions, collective enemy images are 
able to strengthen the capacity for mobilization of these imagined communities. By 
reference to such an imagined community, we have already arrived at the terrain of 
political theory: The idea that the role of the enemy is its use in group formation is 
very much in line with the idea that the function of the enemy is the creation and 
maintenance of a political community, as proposed by Carl Schmitt and Chantal 
Mouffe.  
 
II.2. The concept of the enemy according to Carl Schmitt 
 
Carl Schmitt is considered the most important thinker on the role of enemies 
in politics. For him, the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ is 
the founding stone of politics. In The Concept of the Political (2008) he argues that 
this distinction has an existential character, suggesting that the search for enemies is 
part of human nature and there can be no political community without its Others (i.e. 
                                                        
4 In an imagined community, members know only a small proportion of the community, since it is too 
large. Thus a nation is clearly an imagined community (Anderson, 2006). 
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without those who are not members and, what is more, who threaten the integrity of 
the latter). In other words, the very identity of every group depends on the existence 
of its opposite. He stresses the relational character of every group identity and stresses 
the virtual impossibility of sustaining political pluralism, as every distinction inevitably 
leads to conflict. Those conclusions are in line with Carl Schmitt’s conservatism and 
his disdain for liberal democracy. 
In his late book, The Theory of the Partisan (2007), Schmitt expands his theory 
by describing three distinct types of enemies: limited, real, and absolute. Antagonism 
with the first is limited by norms or rules (such as international law), thus such foes are 
not to be annihilated, but rather defeated or dislodged from one’s territory. The latter 
types are more dangerous, as their aim is always to overthrow the political order, to 
destroy the very essence of their opponents. Yet while the ‘real’ enemy acts to defend 
their land or identity from intruders, the ‘absolute’ enemy wants to further their 
revolutionary cause. The partisan, or shall we say, terrorist, hides among civilians, 
does not follow any rules, and constantly plots the overthrow of the existing order. 
War with an ‘absolute’ enemy can be only absolute, using every possible means. 
Schmitt’s argument was recently revived by Chantal Mouffe (2005) as a counter 
to the liberal utopia of post-political democracy cherished by thinkers such as John 
Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and, especially, Francis Fukuyama in his hotly debated The 
End of History? (1989). For Mouffe, the presupposed erasure of antagonism from 
contemporary liberal politics creates a symbolic space for populist politicians who are 
liberated to use the basic drive behind group identity and mobilize their supporters 
through name-calling. The author argues for the political recognition of the need for 
distinctions, yet in a ‘limited’ (to use Schmitt’s term) version. Democratic politics 
should be fueled with ‘agonism’ (Mouffe, 2005: 20), which means struggle that does 
not infringe one’s right to exist, as struggle itself is rooted in shared culture, 
institutions, language, symbolic space, etcetera. In her vision, conflict is contained by 
law and regulations, and opponents are rather adversaries than enemies. This is, of 
course, a normative vision, as in reality the processes of enemy-making breaches 
institutional barriers. 
 
II.3. Populism, and the enemies of the people 
 
Despite the generalistic nature of ‘the enemy’s’ function, as proposed by 
political theory, in political sociology the use of enemies is attributed mainly to 
populist and extreme-right parties and movements. Populists divide the world into ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, and consider society to be inalienably separated into two homogeneous 
and antagonistic groups of ‘good people’ and ‘corrupt elite’. For populism, ‘the 
centrepiece of identity politics is the construction of ‘the people’ or the in-group’. 
(Woods, 2014: 12) The populist argues that politics should be an expression of the 
general will of the people (Mudde, 2007; Taggart, 2004), and always ‘justifies its 
actions by appealing to and identifying with the people’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 
322). Populism generally politicizes identity, and claims to represent those who are 
true and honest. Populists consider ‘the people’ as a monolithic group without internal 
differences; however, some specific categories of individuals are subject to exclusion. 
While idealizing and worshipping the people, populists degrade and blame elites, 
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accusing them of being alienated from the people, self-centered, arrogant, 
incompetent, and of having no idea what ordinary people need (Barr, 2009; Rooduijn 
et al., 2012). 
In extreme-right discourse, one can clearly distinguish this populist attempt to 
delineate who ‘the people’ are, and who does and should not be part of the people 
(Betz and Johnson, 2004). However, while for the populists the central subject is the 
construction of the people, for the extreme right the central focus is the enemy. 
Moreover, while in the populist vision the world is divided between ‘pure people’ and 
‘corrupted elites’, the extreme right interprets the world through ‘black and white’ or 
‘good and bad’ categories (Eatwell, 2000). The world, according to such a vision, is 
separated between friends, who support the extreme right’s causes, and enemies, who 
oppose them (Caiani and Parenti, 2013). Especially in times of political and social 
changes, the extreme right identifies and mobilizes against scapegoats that are held 
responsible for anything that goes wrong (Minkenberg, 2011). Specifying the Other is 
crucial for the identity-building of the extreme right, since the movement largely 
defines itself through constructing itself as a mirror image of the out-group (Mudde, 
2007; Woods, 2014). According to Ramet, ‘the Other lies at the heart of radical right 
politics, and for the radical right, […] the Other is translated into “Enemy”’ (Ramet, 
1999: 4). 
While the defining features of the in-group in politics often remain rather 
vague, descriptions of the out-groups tend to be very clear. For populists, ‘them’ 
consist mostly of elites, defined in strict opposition to the people, and usually referred 
to as corrupt. Extreme-right parties go further in their appeals in comparison to 
populists, turning the category of ‘them’ into the excluding category of ‘enemies’, and 
going beyond blaming just political elites. In the discourse of the extreme right, 
enemies are usually demonized and often dehumanized (Mudde, 2007). 
Dehumanization operates at the level of victimization – the object is stripped of any 
identity and humanity, reified into an enemy who is selected not by reason of their 
personal characteristics, but on the basis of their group belonging. According to 
Heitmeyer (2003), dehumanization, along with promoting the superiority of one’s own 
group and the inferiority and depersonalization of the Other, is a major part of a more 
general belief in inequality and values attached to the demonstration of power. The 
extreme right projects a ‘group-focused enmity’, which is directed: 
‘not only against those who are ethnically/culturally or religiously different but 
even against those who are ‘the same’ but are defined as ‘deviant’ from the standpoint 
of the right-wing extremist ideology of inequality’ (Heitmeyer, 2003: 401). 
Enemies are targeted through symbolic and/or physical violence, and depicted 
as human decision-makers, rather than impersonal forces such as industrialization or 
the market (Caiani et al., 2012; Gamson, 1992; Polletta and Kai Ho, 2006). 
While populism is a very important part of extreme right-wing ideology, there is 
more to it. Most authors define the extreme right movement as nationalist, 
xenophobic and supportive of antidemocratic authoritarianism. Wimmer (2002) and 
Koopmans et al. (2006) stress that the movement combines attachment to a strong, 
sovereign nation-state with an exclusive, ethnocultural idea of citizenship. Eatwell 
(1996) argues that all movements that belong to that category share a commitment to 
an ideology that reflects a belief in the intrinsic inequality of humans, and the 
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acceptance of violence as a legitimate means of political expression. This means that 
the world of the extreme right is divided into inseparable communities that cannot be 
reconciled. 
John Downes (2015) analyses European national election results and concludes 
that the radical right-wing parties succeeded by employing a policy of antagonism; 
however, the author does not use this specific term. What is interesting is that 
successful radical right movements did not refer to economic problems that emerged 
during the recent crisis. Downes argues that: ‘it does not make rational sense for 
extreme right-wing parties to play the economic card and emphasize economic 
policies as they are not trusted by the majority of the electorate on this policy area’ 
(Downes, 2015: 10). The crisis rewarded, he claims, a ‘clarity of issues’ in politics. In 
other words, the right successfully constructed ‘the enemy’ using the ‘immigration 
crisis’ as a trigger and means of delineating clear-cut borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
at a time of turmoil. Studies of the extreme right have confirmed the observation that 
immigration and cultural differences have been used as ideological fuel for centuries 
(Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). The issue of immigration, clearly linked to antagonism, 
has become, in Kitschelt’s words, an electoral ‘winning formula’ (Kitschelt and 
McGann, 1997), and even moderate right-wing parties thus ‘rationally’ decided to 
employ it. Downes’ research suggests that there exists a process of dissemination of 
enmification in the public sphere that can be grounded in electoral arena choices and 
their consequences. 
 
II.4. The development of collective enemy images 
 
Political theory and political sociology explain the function of enemy images in 
politics and how they are used by political actors. However, they are less inclined to 
explain why the intensity of enmification varies spatially or chronologically. To 
understand the changes in the intensity of enmification, we turn to examining the 
processes that condition the development of enemy images. 
Social psychologists have examined the issue of the development of enemy 
images on both the individual and the group level. Most argue that this is a natural 
process at the individual level (Jung et al., 2002; Murray and Meyers, 1999; 
Oppenheimer, 2006; Volkan, 1985). Therefore group-level processes should explain 
why the intensity of enmification is different in various groups and periods. However, 
to understand group processes, we must first summarize intra-psychic processes as 
well.  
The most important intra-psychic process that leads to the development of 
enemy images is the projection of internal anxieties and stress. Volkan (1985) suggests 
that when a child is not able to integrate all their feelings towards an object (such as 
negative feelings towards parents) s/he will project some ‘unintegrated aspects of 
him[her]self and perceived others onto suitable targets [of externalization]’ (Volkan, 
1985: 234). These targets could be objects such as medals or images of enemies. 
Objects associated with enemies generate negative feelings and aggression. Silverstein 
argues that this process can also happen in adulthood (1989: 905): ‘people who are 
unable to deal on a conscious level with their anxieties and hostilities may project or 
displace them onto a socially accepted source of hostility and fear such as an enemy 
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nation’. Jung et al. (2002) argue that this stress projected and turned into animosity 
may be evoked by an actor or event perceived as hostile or threatening. 
People might turn to this coping mechanism because of their specific 
personality traits. This argument suggests that people who tend to handle their 
anxieties and insecurity by developing enemy images will do it independently of the 
broader social context. Such an argument was first developed by Rokeach (1960). 
Rokeach and Restle (1960) distinguish between open and closed systems as ideal-
typical models of cognitive structures. While the open mind sees the world as a 
friendly place, the closed mind perceives it as threatening. Thus, supported by its 
other characteristics,
5
 the closed mind is more likely to accept enemy images as a 
cause of problems. Naturally, in their empirical findings the acceptance of others and 
the closed/openness of the mind appeared as a continuum rather than a dichotomous 
categorization (Rokeach, 1960).  
People with an authoritarian personality are more likely to experience threats 
and dangers around them (Altemeyer 1981, 1996; Cohrs 2013). Murray and Meyers 
(1999) found that opinion leaders of the United States who saw the Soviet Union as an 
enemy in 1988 maintained their opinion towards Russia after the end of the Cold 
War as well. However, the authors were unable to confirm that these feelings could be 
transferred to different, new enemies when the old enemies disappeared. 
Aside from personality traits, group processes and structural characteristics can 
also cause stressful situations that might be turned into animosity. As we argued 
earlier, the perception of a common enemy is one of the most effective tools for 
forming groups or enhancing their coherence, since contrast and comparison both 
contribute to group identity (Oppenheimer 2006). Groups are defined by enemy 
images too, because group formation serves as a defense mechanism during conflicts. 
When people perceive threats, they are more likely to engage with groups they 
consider their own. This is a regressive defense mechanism, since the need for group 
cohesion ‘switches off’ certain functions of the mind that are responsible for critical 
thinking and the sustaining of individual autonomy (Volkan, 1985). When a group is 
faced with a crisis and the breakdown of its institutionalized task-structure, 
unconscious expectations towards the group leader can arise. One of these is to expect 
the leader to fight the crisis (in the form of the enemy) that threatens the group 
(Volkan 1985). 
Besides group crisis and external threats, group structures cause internal stress 
and contribute to the development of enemy images. Kurt Lewin’s classic research 
(Lewin et al., 1939) shows that the intensity of scapegoating and hostile behavior 
towards other groups is significantly influenced by the level of authoritarianism of 
group leadership. 
Authoritarian group leadership creates a high level of frustration, which leads 
either to aggressive behavior, or to apathy.
6
 Frustration is caused by pressure, and the 
                                                        
5
 As reliance on authority, mixing up the content of information with the intentions of the source of this 
information (e.g. what the source wants the recipient to believe) rejecting disbelief, and evaluating people 
based on their agreement with one’s own beliefs, it is likely that the source of information about out-
groups (and groups that are perceived as threats) is indirect (Rokeach and Restle 1960:55.56). 
6
 Or both: In Lewin’s experiments, when autocratic leaders left a room the level of aggression among 
group members grew rapidly (Lewin et al. 1939). 
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inflexibility of group structure (Lewin et al., 1939). Frustration is also increased by 
relative deprivation (Pettigrew, 2016) as groups might be faced with an unwinnable 
race when comparing their in-group to other groups. One response to these constant 
failures is raising one’s own status against the odds by finding a scapegoat, an enemy to 
whom blame can be allocated (Pataki, 1993). 
Even the earliest studies acknowledge that historical embeddedness and the 
value structure and lifestyles prevalent in a given society are important factors that 
influence individual and group-level processes (Adorno et al., 1950; Lewin et al., 
1939; Rokeach, 1960). Inglehart and his colleagues (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; 
Inglehart, 2008) measure the openness and closeness of a society using an index of 
self-expressive values. They argue that the value structure of a cohort is explained by 
the affluence of resources experienced during its formative years. Thus, put in a 
simplistic way, scarcity or affluence of resources influences in the long run how open 
or closed societies are. The value structure shapes political institutions: open societies 
are more likely to develop stable democratic institutions. 
Oppenheimer (2006) argues similarly, but suggests that the chain of causation is 
reversed. Collective enemy images are easily developed in societies with a hierarchical 
social structure and a non-democratic political system, and where the authoritarian 
parenting style is more prevalent. Culture and national identity affect the 
categorization processes and inculcate certain types of racist beliefs in even young 
children. What is more important is that political ideologies and structure play an 
important role in the types of attribution awarded any given event, person or group. 
One can also argue that different political ideologies use different attribution 
processes on the level of nation-states. In parallel with the assumption that totalitarian 
political systems stimulate hostility and antagonism to a greater degree than 
democratic political systems (Barnet, 1985), totalitarian systems may make greater use 
of external attribution than democratic systems, which more commonly use the tactic 
of internal attribution (Oppenheimer, 2006: 279). 
The literature discussed above highlights many aspects important for 
understanding the recent situation. However, it also has shortcomings. First, although 
many studies have investigated the populist turn and mainstreaming of the extreme 
right, they tend to be descriptive about the recent phenomena. Studies of populism 
and the extreme right have been successful at exploring how enemies are pictured, the 
discursive strategies of political actors, and changes in public discourse. On the other 
hand, they are less inclined to incorporate an analysis of the structural conditions that 
foster the dynamics under study. Social psychology, on the other hand, focuses on the 
structural patterns, but in a generalized way. Since it is embedded in the psychological 
literature, it focuses more on the general mechanisms of group behavior instead of 
explaining how certain structures develop in any given context. Thus, in the third 
section of this paper we focus on the actors which play a role in contextualizing the 
discursive and group patterns we perceive in the politics of enemy making.    
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III. Why are Central and Eastern European societies responsive to the 
politics of enmification? 
 
In this section we provide an outline of the factors considered grounds for 
enmification in the region. While our list here cannot be complete, we describe the 
most important processes and regional characteristics that have led to the hollowing 
out of politics (III.1) and, later on, to bringing political conflict back through various – 
including extreme – means (III.2-III.4). These processes may be classified according 
to the functions and mechanisms proposed above.  
First, we enumerate the political culture and economic processes which, 
embedded in their historical and social context, have led to the maintenance of a 
structure favoring enmification. The fall of the Soviet Bloc led to an increase in hope 
for the blooming of a multitude of possible social, economic and political logics in the 
region (Krapfl and Hrebíček, 2009; Shields, 2012). It seems, however, that the 
historical legacy of Central and Eastern Europe, combined with its geopolitical context 
and its historical path dependency, led to the establishment of a specific political and 
economic model whose societies might be described as ‘hypercapitalist’ or ‘privatized’ 
(Elster et al. 1998; Jacobsson, 2015; Stark, 1994) and also to the neutralization of 
politics through the pacification of protest, the economization of society, and the 
transnationalization of politics. 
Second, specific factors contribute to the need for enemies in politics: 
Multilevel governance, joining the European Union, and the strengthened system of 
international governance have led to increased uncertainty and less controllable 
political opportunities in the region.   
Third, the economic crisis appeared as a threat to local and national 
communities and might have activated the regressive defense mechanisms Volkan 
(1985) refers to. The crisis has led to disappointment with the elites, the 
destabilization of political systems and enforced austerity measures. Political actors 
sought out discursive tools to explain these measures in a way that preserved or even 
increased the loyalty of voters. Fourth, the changes in public discourse are connected 
to changes in the mass media involving processes that provide space to actors that 
employ hostile language.  
 
III.1 Demobilization of society 
 
Pacification of protest 
 
The processes of the demobilization of CEE societies during and just after the 
transition to the liberal regime were meant to curtail any opportunities for the 
radicalization of citizens that would disrupt the transformation, and to restore the 
presumed ‘normal’, rational and standardized working of political and economic 
institutions (Krapfl and Hrebíček, 2009). More general accounts of the pacification of 
political conflict in CEE countries have been provided by students of political culture. 
According to these, the general political passivity in the region is a result of historical 
cultural patterns which were further reinforced during the authoritarian rule of 
socialist states and triumphed after the time when its champions – the pre-1989 
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dissident elite – became part of the new political elite. Sometimes labels such as ‘non-
political politics’ or ‘anti-politics’ are used to describe the widespread ethos of 
maintaining a distance from institutionalized politics, political parties and 
policymaking in general. CEE dissidents – most notably Václav Havel and György 
Konrád – and their conception of civil society and politics supported a non-political, 
ethical and anti-authoritarian politics (Celichowski, 2004; Rupnik, 2007; Smolar, 
1996). This, together with anti-communist resentment, has constituted an obstacle to 
the politicization of social problems in CEE societies and has a long-term pathological 
impact on democratic politics through the negative assessment of processes of interest 
representation (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Renwick, 2006; Tucker et al., 2000).  
Sociologists of social movements have proposed several explanations for the 
strange absence of mass mobilizations during the processes of economic 
transformation in post-socialist countries in the 1990s (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998; 
Greskovits, 1998; Vanhuysse, 2006). First, it was the legal framework and 
fragmentation of trade unions that ultimately led to the pacification of large conflicts – 
even if the trade unions were one of the most important actors in the regime change 
before 1989 (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998). Second, a more complex explanation builds 
on a comparison between Latin America in the late 1970s and Central and Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s – two regions undergoing a processes of radical socio-economic 
transition –, finding that the absence of significant mobilizations was a consequence of 
the relative lack of economic inequality, a lower level of urbanization and the absence 
of a tradition of violent struggles and preexisting forms of social protection 
(Greskovits, 1998: 85). Third, the relative absence of mobilizations after the fall of 
socialism was also explained as the outcome of the strategies of policymakers who 
succeeded in dealing with the situation of the most ‘dangerous’ social groups by 
providing them with selective incentives (in the form of social policies) that dissuaded 
them from protesting, such as early retirement schemes for miners, pro-employment 
policies for youngsters, etc. (Vanhuysse, 2006). 
 
Economization of society 
 
Another dimension of the neutralization of protest was the economization of 
CEE societies after 1989, by which we mean ‘the assembly and qualification of 
actions, devices and analytical/practical descriptions as ‘economic’ by social scientists 
and market actors’ (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009). This directly refers to Schmitt’s 
critique of liberalism as an economic and thus non-political type of argumentation. 
Processes that were earlier observed in Western societies and have been 
conceptualized in various ways started to rage in Eastern Europe: namely, the 
‘increasing influence of economic factors and values on the political agenda and other 
areas of society’ (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999: 210), the ‘economic turn’ (Smart, 
2003), the fetishization of the economy (Foucault, 2008) and the ‘economization of 
every sphere of existence’ (Kane, 2010:81). In short, these processes could be traced 
in CEE because the political transition was perceived and described in dominantly 
economic terms, and the notion of the market economy was as important as the 
notion of democracy (while the two were made interchangeable). A large part of the 
new political elite was recruited from a pool of academic economists or people 
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dealing with finances and management, and key principles and models of neoclassical 
economics started to be professed publicly as ‘natural framework for politics and 
society’ – with the aim of endless liberalization and privatization. New public 
management became the new Marxism-Leninism of both public administration and 
academic economists, revealing the naïve idea of the straightforwardness of the 
transformation from one system to another. 
Generally, the problem was the marginalization of other functions and areas of 
society, and most importantly, suppression of the political dimension of societal 
coordination. The processes of economization are linked to the prominence awarded 
the neoliberal perspective in economy and politics, which – in contrast to classical 
liberalism which sought to protect the economy (market) from the state and politics – 
attempted to actively ‘construct the necessary conditions for markets and non-market 
institutions to function, primarily to govern the social by restructuring the state 
according to a competitive logic through a generalization of the logic of economic 
incentives throughout the state apparatus and beyond the economic domain’ (Madra 
and Adaman, 2013: 22). And it was precisely this perspective that prevailed among 
CEE elites in the 1990s. Key reformists in CEE countries (such as Balcerowicz in 
Poland and Klaus in the Czech Republic) utilized and popularized purely economic 
perspectives on politics and society which, together with the vanishing or dramatic 
transformation of political institutions, democratic political culture in the making, and 
the quest for broader legitimizing narratives for new societal order, led to the 
dominance of economic concerns over politics and culture. This evolution is nicely 
illustrated by a comment that was often used in the late 1990s in the Czech Republic 
when the first broadly negative reflections on post-1989 economic and political 
development arose: ‘the economists simply overhauled the lawyers’. 
 
Transnationalization of politics 
 
Finally, the period of transformation was also accompanied by the restructuring, 
even collapse, of a number of national economies (Christensen, 1998) and also by the 
integration of national states into larger supra-national structures, most importantly, 
the EU. The process of political integration into the EU and the pressures of 
membership led to similar outcomes as did the adoption of support for neoliberal 
hegemony in the sphere of the economy: it significantly contributed to the shift in the 
important functions of economic management and functions vital to the state 
management of the economy, from national political institutions to supposedly neutral 
objective institutions, technocrats, and juridical frameworks (Shields, 2012). This led 
to gradual changes in national policy fields as it transformed the relation between 
citizens, national politicians, and ‘real’ policy-makers and norm-makers. The ties 
between citizens and their national representatives slowly started to hollow out: 
reversals or reforms of policies implemented at the EU level became highly unlikely 
and out of the control of national policy-makers, which further neutralized national 
policy discourses and decreased political conflict – at least within the mainstream ‘pro-
EU camp’ of national politics which clearly dominated throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. Often, national political representatives used the membership of their country 
in the EU to legitimize their unwillingness to deal with new problems, while after 
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animosity towards the EU started to increase, many politicians started to blame the 
EU for both everyday and large-scale problems. However, the perceived distance of 
‘Brussels bureaucrats’ only seldom led to contentious action or the re-politicization of 
domestic conflicts. The consequent resignation of citizens and some part of the elite 
resulting from the localization of politics and the transnationalization of governance 
further de-politicized the national arena, which became a part of a ‘normative and 
strategic environment that they have as yet only partially mastered’ (Mény et al., 1996: 
8). Furthermore, this process was interlinked with the increasing importance awarded 
the neoliberal paradigm in politics and economy which further negatively affected the 
vitality and importance of domestic politics vis-à-vis the rising power of international 
governance and economy structures (Grabbe, 2003). 
 
III.2. The role of Europeanization 
 
The effects of Europeanization and multilevel governance 
 
The above-mentioned transnationalization of politics and the transnational 
means of handling the economic crisis, together with other mechanisms that 
strengthened supra-national institutions, led to an increase in the multi-level 
characteristics of governance whereby national institutions started to operate on the 
meso-level. Moreover, the former processes also contributed to the vilification of 
supra- and transnational institutions, opened a discursive space for the mutual blame-
game throughout Europe, and changed the relations inherent in political and 
discursive opportunity structures.  
Social movement studies – and, increasingly, mainstream political science – 
often analyse the behavior of political actors in the context of various political or 
discursive opportunity structures. Political opportunity structure basically refers to the 
characteristics of a political system: i.e. with what ease social movements, NGOs or 
other non-governmental actors can influence decisions. Influence is had through 
different ‘access points’ such as processes of social dialogue, elections or internal allies 
of non-governmental actors. When a political system is open, it has many access 
points; when it is closed, it has none, or at least the government tries to control these. 
Discursive opportunity structures, on the other hand, refer to a characteristic of the 
social environment in terms of to what extent the environment resonates with the aims 
and values the movement (or any actor) represents (Kriesi, 2004). The configuration 
of political and discursive opportunities defines the relation among the dominant 
actors and their challengers: When opportunity structures are closed, the challenger 
will not be able to gain support, nor will they be able to influence decisions. Open 
discursive opportunities and closed political opportunities mean that dominant actors 
will consider and respond to demands, while the reverse situation will lead to the co-
optation of the challenger. The openness of both opportunity structures creates the 
ground for the inclusion of the challenger and the representation of their demands as 
well (Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Kriesi, 2004). 
This model is proposed mainly for national (or smaller) settings, where it is 
supposed that major political actors, such as governing parties, are able to control 
political opportunities, thus a closed opportunity structure is possible. However, the 
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actual European system of governance is more complex, trans- and international, and 
provides various opportunity structures for civil society organizations to intervene and 
influence decision-making processes (Holzhacker, 2006). These processes not only 
make it possible to influence decision-making processes on the supra-national level, 
but – through the supra-national level – the national level as well. Basically, this means 
that a perfectly closed system of political opportunities on the national level is not 
possible. This fact increases the importance of the other dimension of opportunities: 
to prevent the effective intrusion of challengers at the supra-national level, dominant 
actors have to ‘close’ discursive opportunities by questioning the legitimacy of 




Strengthening of Euroscepticism 
 
EU membership and European integration have provided political actors with a 
powerful issue about which to compete, as the former may be the catalysts of political 
dissent (Almeida, 2010), creating favorable conditions for building upon nationalistic 
appeals and anti-European frames (Bustikova, 2009). Euroscepticism is no longer 
necessarily a fundamental predisposition of peripheral parties (Pirro and van Kessel, 
2013), yet the Eurosceptic and extreme right groups in the region are usually the 
biggest opponents of EU integration. Though most of the extreme right parties in 
CEE (accession) countries were at the beginning of the 1990s initially pro-European as 
a result of a general embrace of a ‘return to Europe’ (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002) and 
the fear of being kept ‘outside’ after the fall of communism (Riishøj, 2007), they soon 
became increasingly negative about the drive towards EU membership. By being 
linked in many cases to the anti-communist struggle or the US as an alleged model of 
integration (Mudde, 2007), the ER has located itself on the side of the defense of 
positions of national demarcation through economic and cultural protectionism 
(Kriesi, 2008). Often accepting the historical and cultural roots of Europe, the ER in 
CEE opposes the political dimension of the EU by claiming that EU membership 
creates a negative comparative disadvantage in terms of the national sovereignty of 
nation states, and a loss of recently regained independence (Pirro, 2014). Culturally, it 
rejects the diffusion of Western or liberal attitudes (Neumayer, 2008) and the liberal 
agenda of the European Union, such as the protection of ethnic and sexual minorities 
and the promotion of gender equality (Bustikova, 2009). As the focus of attention 
moved from ‘accession’ to ‘integration’ in CEE countries, anti-European frames have 
become more prevalent (Pirro and van Kessel, 2013), and the financial and refugee 
crises of recent years have led to the politicization of the issue, making the EU, as an 
enemy, more salient in the political discourse of extreme right-wing parties. 
 
  
                                                        
7
 This might explain the recent upsurge in regulations affecting NGOs capable of taking cases to the 
European Court of Human Rights, lobbying on the European level, or which are embedded in 
international networks. Both Russia and Hungary have recently passed laws  stigmatizing organizations 
that accept funds from foreign donors. For more information, see for example: Independent Civil Society 
Under attack in Hungary: http://www.helsinki.hu/en/antingo/ . Accessed 10/09/2014 . 
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III.3 Economic crisis and economic voting 
 
The ‘Great Recession’ that started with the 2008 global financial crash 
(Balakrishnan, 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Rodrik, 2011) was mainly dealt with 
using austerity measures and a new package of neoliberal policies. These policies were 
opposed in the streets by the mounting of large protests or/and in the ballot box with 
the destabilization of political systems. Especially in Europe, the banking crisis was 
soon transformed into a sovereign debt crisis affecting most EU-peripheral member 
states (Lapavitsas, 2012; Patomäki, 2013). Countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain (all Eurozone members), and Hungary, Romania and Latvia in fact went 
bankrupt, and a special bailout mechanism had to be crafted at the transnational level 
to ‘rescue’ them. This mechanism included not only EU institutions like the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank, but also the IMF, which 
guaranteed the strict implementation and technical surveillance of the rescue 
programs. In short, the three institutions offered bailout loans to countries that could 
not borrow money from the international markets in exchange for austerity measures 
and structural adjustment programs. 
Everywhere in Europe, politics became more contentious, political actors 
intensified the blame game, and most European governments were ousted. Kriesi 
(2014) found that in European countries one of the first signs of popular discontent 
was a drastic shift in voting patterns (Beissinger et al., 2014; Bermeo and Bartels, 
2013; Kanellopoulos and Kousis, forthcoming). Extending the literature on economic 
voting, he argues that, depending on the party system, disaffected voters turned to 
established opposition parties or, in the face of austerity cuts and job losses, opted to 
‘exit’ by 1) rejecting all mainstream parties, the established political elites, or the 
‘political class’, 2) opting for new challengers in the party system who typically adopted 
populist appeals – i.e. the new populist right in Western Europe, or 3) turning against 
all political parties; i.e., abstaining from voting. 
In Central and Eastern European- as well as Western European countries there 
were protests against austerity policies and electoral outcomes were affected. In 
Western countries the economic crisis triggered protest and most governments were 
ousted. In CEE countries the same happened, but protests were already in full swing 
when the crisis intervened due to corruption scandals and the malfunctioning of party 
systems. In spite of the pressure from the public, austerity measures across Europe 
have not (at least yet) been significantly modified. Protest, however, has gradually 
subsided and political participation has fallen. And ‘not because the discontented 
population starts to trust the government, but because it has lost faith in the 
effectiveness of protest and/or because it is forced to acknowledge the constraints 
imposed on the government. Given the constraints of the situation, resigned 
acceptance of the inevitable may replace contention’ (Kriesi, 2014: 304-305). 
Regarding the rise of nationalistic sentiments, the electoral advance of far-right 
parties and growing significance of populism, we argue that the politics of protest were 
replaced and/or continued by the politics of enemy-making. Since no real adjustment 
to neoliberal policies has occurred, social inequalities have become deeper and 
economic disparity endures: a plausible solution for the stabilization of the political 
systems across Europe is thus appearing in the construction of ‘enemies’. Depending 
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on the specific political and historical context of each country, these ‘enemies’ can be 
found among the national minorities, establishment political parties, newly arrived 
refugees from the Middle East, EU bureaucracy, etc. More specifically, it has been 
shown recently that the dynamics of economic protest in Visegrad countries (for 
example) are not directly related to the economic grievances suffered by the 
population, but rather to the (perception) of austerity policies, and that their 
magnitude relates rather to the structure of national political fields. In other words, 
even traditional forms of contention such as economic protests are determined by the 
strategy of elites of framing particular grievances or problems, and their 
capacity/willingness to represent these in the sphere of institutional politics (Císař and 
Navrátil, 2015). Consequently, our exploration of the use of enemies in politics in 
CEE aims also at the analysis of strategies of political and cultural elites, the media, 
and their interaction with extra-institutional mobilizations. 
 
III.4. The role of the media 
 
In explaining public attitudes and beliefs towards minority groups (or ‘Others’), 
the media are said to have great significance. As they focus on particular issues, 
perhaps framing them in a negative and stereotypical way, and provide public space 
for actors who intentionally use enemy images in their agendas, the media 
intentionally or unintentionally provide an environment in which such politics 
becomes the norm. This can happen in several ways: by granting exposure to actors 
who engage in a hostile propaganda, or by highlighting and/or negatively framing the 
issues which are on their agendas (such as immigration in Western Europe, or the 
Roma in Central and Eastern Europe). The tendency of the media is to personalize 
issues and focus on the scandalous features of society and politics that contribute to 
anti-establishment and anti-minority sentiments. For instance, studies that have 
examined the media coverage of Roma generally conclude that this minority is 
presented in a negative and prejudiced way, and that media rarely offer a positive, 
though often also stereotypical, alternative image. Roma communities tend to be 
generalized and silenced in news coverage and are usually referred to in collective 
terms and in connection with criminality and violence, with an emphasis on ethnicity 
(Cangár, 2008; Messing and Bernáth, 2013; Kroon et al., 2016). Media also present 
Roma as a cause of social unrest (Zagibová and Kluknavská, 2013). These sentiments 
not only affect the public opinion of minority groups, but can benefit parties and 
movements such as the extreme right, which engage in anti-minority and xenophobic 
discourse (Kluknavská, 2014). In other words, the media can create favorable 
discursive opportunity structures that affect public opinion, and where the radical 
agenda that creates the ‘us-them’ divide is given space to thrive (Koopmans and Olzak, 
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IV. Summary 
 
In the last few years, there has been an increase in the use of ‘enemy images’ in 
Central and Eastern European politics. In this paper we have put forward an answer 
to the question ‘what stands behind these developments?’ We argued that, to 
understand this process of enmification, we need to use an interdisciplinary approach 
and explore the contextual factors that create the favorable conditions for such a 
politics.  
The existing research is both too narrow and too broad: While the concept of 
‘the enemy’ has been widely recognized in political theory for decades, its empirical 
application is rare. Empirical research studies of populists and the extreme right 
movement elaborate how those two types of actors use the concept of the enemy in 
their politics, but it is rare to find empirical studies that refer to other actors (e.g. social 
movements) that also employ this notion.
8
  
In social psychology and research into values, however, we find useful 
mechanisms for explaining why the intensity of enmification is changing at the group 
and the national level. It seems that the general process of projecting internal anxieties 
is strengthened by hierarchical structures, demobilized societies, authoritarian 
leadership, and events perceived as threats. It is tempting to compare those factors 
with the political culture and historical development of Central and Eastern Europe, 
or to the recent crises. 
Thus, in the second part of this study we highlighted factors connected to the 
mechanisms elaborated in the literature review of the concept and general 
mechanisms of enemy-making. The legacy of the elite-led transition to democracy left 
societies politically demobilized, without institutions that could allow them to 
legitimately represent their interests. This, combined with the economization of 
politics and its transnationalization led to the hollowing out of the political sphere in 
CEE. Subsequent processes then led to the return of politics, often via radical means. 
The strengthening of multi-level governance has encouraged the use of enemy 
images in politics because supra-national institutions become part of domestic fights 
and provide an external faction to blame. When politicians portray European 
institutions as enemies, Western-oriented adversaries who see European institutions 
as a means of enforcing ‘more rational’ policies on governments are easily painted as 
traitors. This suggests that, despite the transnationalization of politics, the main 
interests of the elites are still connected to national-level politics.  
The economic crisis (or other phenomena perceived of as crises) provide an 
opportunity for politicians to trigger the regressive defense mechanisms of forming 
cohesive groups loyal to their leaders, and exploiting discursive opportunities that a 
tabloidized media already provide, such as access to an audience sensitive to threats 
and stereotypical images.  
Economic and political processes are interlinked with historically embedded 
political culture. Haerpfer and Kizilova (2014) found that support for democratic 
institutions and democratic political culture is strongly correlated to the success of 
                                                        
8
 There is plenty of research that deals with the perceptions of minorities and out-groups. We highlight 
that this is not connected to the concept we employ in this study.  
 
32 MÁRTON GERŐ, PIOTR P. PŁUCIENNICZAK, ALENA KLUKNAVSKA,  
 JIŘÍ NAVRÁTIL AND KOSTAS KANELLOPOULOS  
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 14-40. 
Central and Eastern European transitions and institutional performance. In this 
regard, most Central European countries show important deficits.  
Based on this review, we suspect that these factors contribute to the structural 
conditions that enhance the prevalence of a social psychological status that favors 
enmification as a copying strategy. The actual mechanism of how these conditions, 
elites and people interact is not entirely clear. Most empirical and theoretical research 
until now has dealt with the political use of enemies to small groups, or at the level of 
the individual psyche. Recent phenomena and empirical research suggest that 
imagined communities might react to threats in a similar way to that of small groups 
(Pettigrew, 2016). One of these reactions is the regressive defense mechanism of 
strengthening group cohesion, identifying with the group leader, and projecting stress 
onto an external object, usually an out-group. (Pataki, 1993) The out-group is not 
necessarily – and in the region in question, increasingly not – a foreign nation, but 
rather takes the form of a hidden, internal enemy, vague social groups, and 
international institutions.  
The rise of authoritarian populism in Central and Eastern Europe illustrates the 
troublesome consequences of contemporary politics. This type of community building 
undermines the possibility of re-negotiating problems and of creating discursive 
reactions to newly emerging issues, and leads to the translation of social and economic 
problems into antagonistic conflicts. In this paper, we argue that the recent 
developments of European politics must be interpreted and explored from different 
perspectives to allow us to understand both the general and contextual dimensions of 
the uses of enemies in politics. For this, we need more empirical research that shows 
these processes ‘from below’, considering their specific historical and economic 
circumstances, and, moreover, the psychological conditions inherent in the 
functioning of the friend-enemy distinction.  
In such research we need to combine different levels of analysis. Discursive 
approaches and research on media and organizations may capture the dynamics of 
political systems, while research on participation and citizens’ reactions to the 
discourses might tell us why they are working. This multilevel analysis should be 
supported by an analysis of the historically embedded dynamics and transformations 
of the social and economic structure. Existing, unidisciplinary research is clearly 
limited in its attempt to describe the multi-dimensional processes that are taking place 
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